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Strengthening Boards Through Diversity:
A Two-Sided Market That Can Be
Effectively Serviced By Intermediaries
Akshaya Kamalnath†
Abstract
The current focus on the monitoring role of the corporate board
has come under much criticism. Independent directors play a
significant role within this model. However, their ability to truly
function independently has been rightly questioned in the last
decade. Independent directors are impeded by two main problems:
first, the lack of access to relevant information, for which they are
reliant on management, and second, the high likelihood of being
captured (to varying degrees) by management. There have been
various suggestions to fix these problems, ranging from enhancing
board diversity to drastically reforming the current model of
corporate boards.
This Article argues that diversity holds the promise of slowly
reforming the current board model, so long as well-considered
measures are taken. To that end, this Article will propose a model of
board governance that relies on providers of supplemental board
services as intermediaries to facilitate diversity on boards. This
model will, on the one hand, allow companies to attract both the best
and diverse directors and on the other hand, allow board candidates
(especially diverse candidates) to make well-informed decisions
about taking on directorships. Eventually, companies may choose to
share these reports with investors and the general public to signal
their commitment to diversity and governance. Finally, the proposed
model has the potential to drive boards to take on more of an
advisory role along with the current focus on monitoring.

†. Senior Lecturer, the Australian National University, College of Law. I am
grateful to participants and organizers of the Feminism and Corporate Law:
Reforming Corporate Governance Roundtable for their comments on the article
during the Roundtable event. I am also grateful to Professor Cindy Schipani,
Professor Faith Stevelman, and Professor Jefferey M. Lipsaw for comments on
earlier drafts. All errors are mine.
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Introduction
The present model of the board of directors has come under
much criticism, and the search is on for both potential fixes to the
existing model and new governance models.1 This Article argues
that diversity can strengthen boards, provided that effective
mechanisms are adopted as well. It will propose a model where
supplemental providers of board services, like executive search
firms and board evaluation providers, can assist in obtaining these
benefits.
Increasing diversity on corporate boards has become an
important issue for two reasons. First, diversity on corporate
boards, by increasing workplace diversity (with a focus on
demographic diversity), helps to reduce workplace inequality.2
Second, diversifying the corporate board increases the variety of
perspectives in decision making, which in turn improves corporate
governance.3
Since gender diversity is easily measurable and most people
agree on the need for gender equality, corporate diversity has come

1. See, e.g., MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS 141–56 (1976) (critiquing the modern board practice and offering
proposals for reform of the existing working models and legal models); see also
Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing
Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1072 (2014) (arguing that companies
should outsource board activities as an alternative to the current practices).
2. See Mark McCann & Sally Wheeler, Gender Diversity in the FTSE 100: The
Business Case Claim Explored, 38 J. L. & SOC’Y 542, 574 (2011) (“Women should be
appointed as NEDs as an issue of social justice . . . .”).
3. See Akshaya Kamalnath, Defining Diversity in Corporate Governance: A
Global Survey, 45 J. LEGIS. 1 (2018) (discussing the meaning of diversity within
corporate governance).
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to focus mostly on gender.4 The re-emergence of the Black Lives
Matter movement following the murder of George Floyd has also
brought attention to racial diversity in corporate boards.5 This
Article will show how the benefits of equality and corporate
governance due to diversity on corporate boards are intertwined.
Before elaborating on these combined benefits of board
diversity, it is necessary to mention that there is also a “business
case” for board diversity; proponents of this business case attempt
to show that diverse boards can be linked to increased profitability.6
However, this is a very difficult link to prove, since a firm’s profits
are dependent on numerous factors. This problem is not unique to
board diversity. The economic value of other corporate governance
best practices, like independent directors, is also difficult to prove
empirically, again because firm profits are dependent on various
factors. Despite this difficulty, there is a continued reliance on the
business case for board diversity, most likely because it is the
easiest and most attractive way to “sell” board diversity to various
groups.7 This Article will not focus on the business case for diversity
on boards nor the studies that have shown a correlation (positive or
negative) between women directors and increased profits.8
Returning to the benefits of board diversity, the link between
motivations for equality and motivations for corporate governance
becomes clear when we think about what is meant by “corporate
governance.” Although the board’s monitoring role is often the
priority in large, public companies, corporate governance also

4. Id. at 2.
5. See Gaurdie Banister, How Black Lives Matter in Corporations—This Time
Can Be Different, CORPORATE BOARD MEMBER, https://boardmember.com/how-blacklives-matter-in-corporations-this-time-can-be-different/
[https://perma.cc/JM9494FQ].
6. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L.
REV. 795, 810–30 (2005) (using a cost-benefit analysis to argue that some business
case rationales are flawed); see also McCann & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 557–73
(showing that the business rationale did not hold up based on an empirical analysis
of FTSE 100 companies).
7. See Darren Rosenblum, When Does Sex Diversity on Boards Benefit Firms, 20
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 429 (2018) (critiquing corporate reliance on business case arguments
for increasing board diversity).
8. See, e.g., Akshaya Kamalnath, Corporate Governance Case for Board Gender
Diversity: Evidence from Delaware Cases, 82 ALB. L. REV. 23, 28–29 (2018) (“The first
wave of empirical literature on board gender diversity focused on the link between
women directors and firm profits. However, the results of these studies are far from
unequivocal, with some showing a positive correlation, others showing a negative
correlation and still others showing no correlation.”) (footnotes omitted).
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involves providing both strategic guidance to management and
access to various resources and networks.9 Drawing from these
functions, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development defines corporate governance as follows:
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring
performance are determined.10

The emphasis on the board’s monitoring role means that the
benefits to corporate governance from diversity are understood as
an improvement in the board’s monitoring function.11 Thus, the
argument that diverse candidates, by bringing in different
perspectives, do a better job of assisting the board in questioning
and monitoring management has rightly gained ground.12 However,
the fact that boards also guide management, especially in times of
crisis, means that boards should be attuned to the needs of various
stakeholders.
Similarly, diverse candidates might also allow companies to
access social networks that they might not otherwise be able to
access.13 The equality rationale mainly seeks to address the
problem of qualified women and other minority groups being unable
to access board positions as a result of conscious or unconscious
bias.14 However, this rationale could be expanded further to
incorporate the idea that diverse boards would be better able to

9. OECD, G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 13, 45 (2015),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264236882en.pdf?expires=1593925258&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=06E9199088BE18
A42F2D9F92B476C436 [https://perma.cc/9QXK-DJNP].
10. Id. at 9.
11. See Kamalnath, supra note 8, at 23.
12. See Rene B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their
Impact on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (2009) (finding that
female directors enhance monitoring); see, e.g., Michal Barzuza, Proxy Access for
Board Diversity, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1279, 1284 (2019) (arguing that diversity can
increase board accountability because “[d]iversity is likely to increase board
turnover, independence, and monitoring functions”).
13. See Debbie A. Thomas, Bias in the Boardroom: Implicit Bias in the Selection
and Treatment of Women Directors, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 539, 559–60 (2018) (noting
that board members have a tendency to recruit new members from a homogenous,
small, and personal network instead of from a more diverse pool of individuals).
14. McCann & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 550 (“[I]n a world where rights to gender
equality are seen as a basic human right there can be no case for exclusion.”); see
also Thomas, supra note 13 (discussing the role of implicit bias in preventing women
from obtaining board positions).
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guide management with regard to problems concerning various
stakeholder groups. Although not theorized in this manner, we see
in practice that companies and the general public react to a crisis
involving the mishandling of sexual harassment claims by adding a
woman director,15 or to racial injustice issues by calling for a Black
director.16 While some of these may be ill-advised knee-jerk
reactions, which could impose heavy burdens on minority directors,
these early stirrings indicate that the rationales for equality and
corporate governance are connected.
Therefore, diversity can strengthen boards in many ways, as
long as all stakeholders are aware of and guard against issues like
tokenism, stereotyping, and overburdening diverse members on the
board. This Article proposes a model that will address each of these
issues. Part I will outline the issues with the current monitoring
board model and examine some of the fixes and alternatives that
have been proposed. Part II will discuss the diversification of
boards, showcasing the promise this could have for companies but
also exploring the potential issues that could impact companies and
diverse candidates. Part III will then propose a model that relies on
third-party intermediaries to service companies, diverse board
members, and eventually other stakeholders. This Article will
conclude with some thoughts about future research on this topic.
I. The Current Monitoring Board – Problems and Solutions
The board of directors has three functions: to provide strategic
advice,17 bring valuable resources in the form of expertise and
access to networks,18 and monitor management.19 Although the
board of directors is generally required to run the company, it
became apparent by the 1970s that, for large, public companies, the
board of directors would not be involved in the day-to-day

15. See, e.g., Michelle Meyers, Arianna Huffington Becomes Uber’s First Female
Board Member, CNET (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.cnet.com/news/ariannahuffington-becomes-ubers-first-female-board-member/
[https://perma.cc/Y9YHDE9V] (“[Huffington’s] addition to Uber’s board comes as the company . . . faces an
outcry over its record of passenger safety, particularly for women.”).
16. See Banister, supra note 5.
17. Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 267 (1997).
18. Lynne L. Dallas, The Relational Board: Three Theories of Corporate Boards
of Directors, 22 J. CORP. L. 1, 10 (1996).
19. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 308
(1976) (noting that the monitoring model of the board is based on agency theory).
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management.20 As a result of this change, Professor Melvin
Eisenberg proposed that boards take on a stronger monitoring
role.21 He proposed that the board’s primary functions were to
supervise, monitor, and select executive management.22 In order for
boards to perform these functions effectively, Eisenberg believed
that laws should ensure that boards are independent of the
executives they monitor and that they receive adequate and
objective information, which would enable them to properly execute
their monitoring function.23
Based on the recommendations of Eisenberg and a few
others,24 the American Law Institute (ALI) sought to enhance the
monitoring, or oversight, function of the board in a draft of its 1984
Principles of Corporate Governance.25 Ultimately, the Principles
were published with a focus on increasing the number of
independent directors on the board rather than making any
substantive changes to the content of directors’ duties.26 Such a
focus on independent directors has now been adopted in almost all
of Delaware’s jurisdictions.27 This idea has been stamped into U.S.
corporate law through the rules of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the stock exchanges, NYSE and NASDAQ,
which require public corporations to have a majority of independent
directors on the board and on many board committees.28
The independent-director model has, however, come under
increasing scrutiny, especially after the global financial crisis, in
which large companies with a majority of independent directors
failed to adequately monitor their management.29 The main
20. See George W. Dent Jr., The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the
Monitoring Board, and the Director’s Duty of Care, 61 B.U. L. REV. 623, 623, 625
(1981).
21. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 162–68.
22. Id. at 162, 168.
23. Id. at 170.
24. Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, The Import of History to Corporate Law, 59 ST. LOUIS
U. L. J. 683, 688–90 (2015).
25. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
3.04 (AM. L. INST. 1984) (tentative draft No. 2).
26. Mitchell, supra note 24, at 690.
27. Id. (“Fully embracing the model as a structural rather than substantive one,
the Delaware courts focused on the role of the independent directors.”).
28. Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policy Makers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251,
282–88 (2006).
29. See, e.g., Theodore N. Mirvis & William Savitt, The Dangers of Independent
Directors, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481 (2016); see also Claire A. Hill & Brett H.
McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight Duties After the Financial Crisis, 2013
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criticism is that independent directors are unable to act truly
independently of the CEO, and are therefore unable to effectively
monitor management.30 One explanation for this failure is that
independent directors often belong to the same social circles as the
CEO, making them sympathetic to the CEO and unlikely to
challenge a course of action suggested by the CEO.31
Even if independent directors were able to truly be
independent of management, independent directors usually lack
firm-specific commitment to their companies.32 Beyond the global
financial crisis, scholars have analyzed isolated corporate scandals
and concluded that independent directors are so over-committed
that they are unable to adequately monitor management.33
Independent directors are reliant on the CEO for information about
the company, which makes it difficult for independent directors to
effectively oversee management.34 Even when they are provided
with all of the relevant information, independent directors are often
unable to digest vast amounts of information because they hold
multiple board memberships and are often themselves executives
and CEOs of other companies.35
Following the acknowledgement of these deficiencies in the
monitoring model of the board, with independent directors as the
sharpest tools in the box, it is natural that scholars and companies
have been looking for alternatives. At one extreme is the proposal
by Professors Bainbridge and Henderson, who propose that the job
of boards may be altogether outsourced to external service
providers, such as law firms and auditing firms.36 However, this
proposal has not had much practical uptake even outside the United

U. ILL. L. REV. 859, 874–75 (2013) (arguing that financial catastrophes, such as those
at the center of In re Goldman Sachs and In re Citigroup, show that companies need
to better monitor information, control, and risk management systems to avoid
liability).
30. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, Marrying Diversity and Independence in the
Boardroom: Just How Far Have You Come, Baby?, 86 OR. L. REV. 373 (2007).
31. Fisch, supra note 17, at 270.
32. Mirvis & Savitt, supra note 29, at 487–88.
33. Jeremy C. Kress, Board to Death: How Busy Directors Could Cause the Next
Financial Crisis, 59 B.C. L. REV. 877, 918 (2018).
34. E.g., DAVID F. LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, NETFLIX APPROACH TO
GOVERNANCE: GENUINE TRANSPARENCY WITH THE BOARD 1 (2018) (discussing the
“information gap” between management and boards that arises as a result of board
members not being actively involved with daily operations).
35. Akshaya Kamalnath, The Perennial Quest for Board Independence: Artificial
Intelligence to the Rescue, 83 ALB. L. REV. 43, 49 (2019).
36. Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 1, at 1072.
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States, particularly in countries where corporations are not
prohibited from being board directors.37
An alternative model, which has come out of innovative
practices at Netflix (the Netflix Model), proposes that directors have
better access to information.38 This model includes two practices not
seen in the traditional board model. The first practice is that
directors regularly attend monthly and quarterly senior
management meetings, albeit in an observational capacity.39 The
second practice is that board communications are “structured as
approximately 30-page online memos in narrative form that not
only include links to supporting analysis but also allow open access
to all data and information on the company’s internal shared
systems, including the ability to ask clarifying questions of the
subject authors.”40 These communications are then “shared with the
top 90 executives as well as the board.”41 The CFO of Netflix
explains the second practice as follows:
[The board memo] is part of the evolution from a presentation
culture to a memo-based culture [internally across the
company]. Once you have the ability to effectively write
collaboratively, you can then graduate to a memo that is
collaboratively written . . . .The central coordinator, if there is
one, is likely Reed [Hastings, the CEO of Netflix] himself or my
Financial Planning & Analysis group. Or, for each of the areas
that are writing these deeper memos, they have the C-level
owner take responsibility for that.42

A third practice that some companies might claim to have, although
uncommon, involves a board culture steeped in amenable
collaboration. One board member describes this culture as follows:
Reed [Hastings] has always been masterful at hiring really good
people, pushing decision making to those people, and not
micromanaging. Letting decisions roll up and be debated rather
than micromanaged. That style, that kind of management
philosophy rolls up into the board meetings where any one of
the members of [the CEO]’s staff can comment or disagree, or
take questions from any of us around the table and answer
them openly.43

37. The lack of reporting on the outsourcing of board services indicates that it
has likely not yet occurred; should a company outsource its board services, there
would most likely be ample reporting of the matter.
38. LARCKER & TAYAN, supra note 34, at 1.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 3 (first and second alterations in original).
43. Id. at 3–4.
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Another board member says that “the overall tone Reed has set,
really from early days, is around transparency . . . . There is no
editorializing. There’s no censorship.”44
Although the directors talk about the quality of board
members, the striking point about culture that comes from these
comments (quoted above) is that both board members and the
management staff are free to disagree, ask questions, and voice
their own ideas.45 This underlines the important role the CEO plays
in setting the tone and culture, not only for the board of directors,
but also for members of the management team.46 This open culture
is crucial for Netflix’s practices of facilitating information flow
through board attendance at management meetings and the thirty
page memos provided to the board pre-meeting. It is questionable
whether the Netflix Model can be adopted in its entirety by larger
companies with numerous management teams. Board members
would be grossly over-extended if they were required to attend all
management meetings for large companies. Some aspects of the
Netflix Model, however, should be encouraged in larger companies,
particularly the CEO facilitating a culture of openness and
freethinking in the board and management teams.
Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon provide an additional
alternative to the current monitoring board model: they call it the
“Board 3.0” Model, and propose that board members are “thickly
informed, well-resourced and highly motivated,” similar to the
private equity model.47 Calling the initial advisory model of the
board, “Board 1.0,” and the next monitoring model of the board,
“Board 2.0,” Gilson and Gordon explain that two developments since
the adoption of the Eisenberg model required a change in board
models: (1) the switch to majoritarian, institutional ownership of
most large public companies, and (2) the rise of hedge funds.48 These
developments indicate that management is being challenged by
activist investors, and Gilson and Gordon argue that the board
should be able to either defend management against such attacks

44. Id. at 4.
45. Id. at 3–4.
46. The idea of management setting the tone at the top is often used in the
context of corporate culture. See, e.g., Alfredo Contreras, Aiyesha Dey & Claire Hill,
Tone at the Top and the Communication of Corporate Values: Lost in Translation, 43
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 497 (2020).
47. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Boards 3.0: An Introduction, 74 BUS.
L. 351, 353 (2019).
48. Id. at 352–53.
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or, where appropriate, insist that management take the challenges
seriously.49
Like other critics of the current monitoring model, they also
believe that Board 2.0 directors were not strong enough on oversight
of the company’s strategy and operational performance because of
both time constraints and dependence on the CEO for information.50
These issues led Board 2.0 directors to rely on stock prices to
evaluate management.51 To overcome these issues, Gilson and
Gordon proposed the Board 3.0 Model, in which “directors could
credibly to themselves and to majoritarian owners assert that the
stock price is missing a critical element of expected future
realizations.”52 They see the Board 3.0 Model as mirroring the
private equity model, which charges the board with a mix of
monitoring and operational roles.53
[A] Board 3.0 . . . is a board that contains a mix of directors on
the current Board 2.0 model and “empowered” directors (“3.0
directors”) who would specifically be charged with monitoring
the strategy and operational performance of the management
team. The 2.0 directors would serve, as now, on compliancefocused committees and otherwise take on the board’s
responsibilities, especially serving on “special committees” as
necessary. The 3.0 directors would serve on an additional
committee, the “Strategy Review Committee.” Those directors
would be supported by an internal “strategic analysis office”
that would provide back-up support for a 3.0 director’s
engagement with the management team. If additional support
was necessary, the 3.0 directors could engage outside
consultants.54

Gilson and Gordon also address the issue of independent
directors not being able to operate independently of management by
proposing that Board 3.0 directors should have limited terms so
that they are not “captured” by management.55 While the
compensation structure for independent directors is an important
issue,56 this Article will not focus on it because effective monetary
incentives alone are not enough to address the main issues plaguing
49. Id. at 353.
50. Id. at 356.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 357.
53. Id. at 359.
54. Id. at 361.
55. Id.
56. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 47, at 361 (proposing that the 3.0 directors
within their new board model would be paid mainly through long-term stock
compensation to incentivize them to enhance value creation for the company).
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the current monitoring board model (i.e., directors being poorly
informed).57 Importantly, the Board 3.0 Model is currently
hypothetical and is something that companies might experiment
with in the future.58 However, a voluntary pivot to this model is
unlikely because companies would need to overcome status quo
bias.59 In any case, the take-home message of the Board 3.0 Model
is that there are elements of the monitoring model that are worth
retaining, but other elements relevant to the advisory model of the
board are worth introducing.
The next proposal to fix the problems of the current monitoring
model of the board comes from Faith Stevelman and Sarah Haan,
who have suggested some “relatively low-cost, low-risk changes”
that they believe would “improve boards’ ability to deliver on the
promise of improved corporate governance.”60 Their proposal
consists of eight points: (1) separation of the CEO’s and the Chair’s
roles; (2) being transparent about the CEO’s involvement in the
director search process; (3) increasing board diversity; (4) a nonbinding expectation that director terms would be limited to a
certain number of years; (5) the professionalization of directors via
credentialing as in the case of doctors and lawyers; (6) board selfevaluation with the board chair, using these surveys to gauge the
directors’ understanding of the company’s interests and also in the
director selection process; (7) the creation of an informational
infrastructure (similar to the one adopted by the Netflix Model, but
different than directors actually being present at management
meetings) that lets information flow directly to the board, rather
than through the CEO;61 and (8) designing internal codes of conduct
and structuring compensation packages to ensure that there is a
reciprocal duty of candor between directors and the CEO.62 All of
these points, like the other proposals, seek to address the main
deficiencies in the current monitoring model of the board.

57. Id. at 353 (“On the present board model, well-meaning directors are
nonetheless thinly informed . . . .”).
58. Although there is no evidence to suggest that companies are pursuing the
Gilson and Gordon model, the authors’ original goal was to create an experimental
model following the previous experiment, Board 2.0. Id. at 354.
59. Id. at 361–62 (detailing the costs of implementing the Board 3.0 model,
including friction against the company’s current strategy).
60. Faith Stevelman & Sarah C. Haan, Board Governance for the Twenty-First
Century, 74 BUS. L. 329, 338 (2019).
61. See Faith Stevelman & Sarah C. Haan, Boards in Information Governance,
23 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 179 (2020), for a detailed discussion of this point.
62. Stevelman & Haan, supra note 60, at 338–48.
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Another potential avenue is Bainbridge and Henderson’s
Board Service Providers (BSP) Model, a provocative wake-up call
that argues boards are not doing what they are supposed to be
doing. However, the BSP Model itself will require us to re-imagine
where decision-making should rest in corporate law. If the
corporation is bound to decisions made by an external firm that is
providing board services, then the incentives underpinning such a
model would need to be examined in great detail before adopting
it.63 External audit firms have failed to detect fraud in many
instances,64 and it is not clear why a similar model would not give
rise to similar failures for BSP firms. On the other hand, the Board
3.0 Model offers an interesting model that firms might adopt,
although it would require companies to invest resources in
restructuring their boards into this model.65
This Article will propose a model that uses diversity to
strengthen boards, while also ensuring that the diverse board
candidates are not over-burdened. Additionally, it will draw on and
develop further some aspects of Stevelman and Haan’s proposal,
particularly those relating to diversity, professionalization, board
evaluations, and the director selection process, as well as ideas that
emerged from the Netflix Model. The model proposed in Part III of
this Article will rely on third-party intermediaries (i.e., executive
search firms and other organizations providing supplemental
services to the board).
II. The Promise of Diversity – Addressing Both Sides of
the Market
Board diversity is often expected to solve corporate governance
and workplace equality problems as if it were fairy dust.66 In reality,
although diversity certainly comes with its benefits, if not properly
implemented, it may impose costs on both companies and the

63. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 47, at 364 (distinguishing the Board 3.0
model from the BSP model); see also Stevelman & Haan supra note 60, at 330–38
(critiquing the BSP model and the incentives it creates).
64. See Accountancy Giants Face Revamp Amid Criticism, BBC NEWS (Jul. 6,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53307572 [https://perma.cc/W3ZV-2347],
for a recent example.
65. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 47, at 361–63 (discussing the compensatory and
reputational costs associated with implementing the Board 3.0 model).
66. See Fairfax, supra note 6 (evaluating the harm done by poor implementation
of board diversity efforts despite an apparent increase in board diversity).

2022]STRENGTHENING BOARDS THROUGH DIVERSITY 167
diverse board candidates being appointed.67 In this Part, the Article
will consider diversity from both sides of the market (i.e., companies
on one side and the diverse board members, usually women and
members of racial minority groups, on the other).
Companies want to see how their boards may be strengthened
by diversity. The discussion in Part I makes it apparent that one of
the major problems with the existing board model is the
overemphasis on the monitoring function.68 Another major problem
is that the current model has not been successful in fulfilling the
monitoring role due to informational disadvantages, a lack of true
independence from the CEO, and the inability to exercise
independence where it exists.69 Simply adding diverse candidates to
the board will not solve all of these problems. Thus, any proposal to
strengthen boards through diversity should be complemented by
various other mechanisms, as Stevelman and Haan have done.70
As a first step, the benefits of diversity to both the monitoring
and operational functions of the board should be explored. The idea
that diverse boards are better at monitoring upper management
flows partly from the assumption that diverse candidates are more
likely to come from different social circles and hence will not
hesitate to question management.71 Furthermore, it is assumed
that diverse candidates will bring with them different life
experiences, which in turn helps them provide alternative
perspectives to the board discussion.72 The hope is that these
different perspectives will help overcome “groupthink,” when
members of a cohesive group, striving for unanimity, are unable to
realistically appraise alternative courses of actions.73 However, as
67. Id. at 853–54 (concluding that justifying board diversity through business
rationales alone may promote unrealistic expectations of business performance and
marginalize diverse board members).
68. Most of the problems with the current model stem from the apparent
necessity for boards to monitor corporate performance. See supra Part I.
69. See Stevelman & Haan, supra note 61, at 180, 243, 262. This combination of
informational disadvantage and inability to exercise director independence
exacerbates all the more the problems stemming from the overemphasis of the
monitoring function.
70. See Stevelman & Haan, supra note 60.
71. Nanette Fondas, Women on Boards of Directors: Gender Bias or Power
Threat?, in WOMEN ON CORPORATE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: INTERNATIONAL
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 172–73 (Ronald J. Burke & Mary C. Mattis eds.,
2000) (referring to researchers suggesting that “more varied personal and
professional backgrounds” of women contributed to more influence over management
decisions).
72. AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY 157 (2015).
73. See Akshaya Kamalnath, Gender Diversity as the Antidote to Groupthink on
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the interviews of board members of Netflix demonstrate, it is not
common for a board to have a culture where dissentient views are
encouraged.74 Relying on diverse board members to overcome a
board culture that discourages alternate viewpoints as a means of
enhancing the board’s monitoring function puts an unreasonable
burden on these members.75
There is a range of empirical studies showing the impact that
women directors have on a number of proxies for monitoring.76 For
instance, in an oft-cited study, Renee B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira
found that women directors enhance monitoring.77 However,
evidence suggests that gender diversity had beneficial effects only
in companies where additional monitoring is required.78 Thus, the
impact of women directors seems to depend on the needs on each
firm. In the context of mergers and acquisitions, one study found
that women directors were less acquisitive than their male
counterparts when pursuing deals.79 On the other hand, a different
study, focusing on banks, found evidence to suggest that more
women on boards would not necessarily lead to less risk being taken
by banking companies.80 Since these studies are not unequivocal,
this Article will not rely on the empirical literature.81
Unfortunately, there are not as many studies on the impact of race
or other forms of diversity on board monitoring.82
It is, however, worth noting that in a qualitative study of
Delaware cases examining whether gender diversity improves
Corporate Boards, 22 DEAKIN L. REV. 85 (2017).
74. Larcker & Tayan, supra note 34, at 1.
75. See DHIR, supra note 72, at 147–72 (concluding from interviews of directors
in Norway that the introduction of women directors enhanced board processes).
76. See Deborah H. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards:
How Much Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377 (2014)
(analyzing multiple studies on board diversity).
77. Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their
Impact on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 292 (2009).
78. Id. at 292, 307.
79. Maurice Levi, Kai Li & Feng Zhang, Men are from Mars, Women are from
Venus: Gender and Mergers and Acquisitions 4, 20 (Nov. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript)
(on
file
with
the
American
Economic
Association),
https://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2012conference/program/retrieve.php?pdfid=191.
80. Renee B. Adams & Vanitha Ragunathan, Lehman Sisters 8 (Sept. 3, 2015)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(on
file
with
SSRN),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2380036.
81. See Kamalnath, supra note 8, for a summary of empirical studies specifically
linking diversity to the board’s monitoring function.
82. This illustrates a limit on the current research of the impact board diversity
has on corporate performance. More research needs to be done to properly evaluate
the likely beneficial impact diversity has on governance.
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corporate governance, this author found that in some cases where
the company had women directors, their decision-making was not
very different from their male counterparts.83 This is probably
because the women had C-Suite experience and as a result did not
bring with them a remarkably different perspective, at least in the
context of the acquisition the decisions were about.84
In another case, two newly appointed directors, not diverse in
terms of gender, questioned the board’s decision not to fire the CEO
in the face of a crisis.85 This was possibly attributable to the fact
that they were newly appointed to the board after the company had
already received negative publicity.86 Thus, board members who
belong to different social groups/networks and newly appointed
directors are likely to be better monitors, irrespective of their
gender or race. This adds weight to the adoption of soft term limits
for board directors, which was part of Stevelman and Haan’s
proposal.87
The same study of Delaware cases also found that when the
same person held both the position of CEO and board chair, the
board’s ability to monitor management effectively was impaired.88
This is again consistent with Stevelman and Haan’s proposal.89
However, the study goes on to note that the CEO and his “inner
circle,” all of whom were male and had worked together for a long
time, within the management team seemed to be aware of and
involved in the illegal activities carried on in the company.90 This
indicates the need for diversity within management teams and
executive directors as well.91 Furthermore, as the interviews of the
Netflix directors show, the CEO must prioritize a culture within
both the board and management teams that allows open discussion
and transparency.92
83. Kamalnath, supra note 8, at 115.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 113.
86. Id. at 116.
87. Stevelman & Haan, supra note 60, at 343; see also Yaron Nili, The “New
Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Directors’ Tenure, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 97 (2016)
(proposing that the increase in average director tenure is a direct response to
independence requirements that lead companies to seek new directors).
88. Kamalnath, supra note 8, at 116.
89. Stevelman & Haan, supra note 60, at 343.
90. Kamalnath, supra note 8, at 80, 116–17.
91. Id. at 80; see also Afra Afsharipor, Bias, Identity and M&A, 2020 WIS. L. REV.
471, 484–85 (2020) (observing that increased gender diversity on boards is associated
with “more vigorous board monitoring”).
92. Larcker & Tayan, supra note 34, at 4.
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Thus, while diverse directors are valuable, that diversity
should not be restricted to independent directors. Liminality (i.e.,
outsider status) also plays an important role in monitoring ability,
so periodic board refreshment is necessary.93 Finally, the CEO
should be invested in improving the board and top management
culture. Such changes will help facilitate the free flow of
information from management to the board and advice from the
board to management.94 The question then is how companies, and
more specifically CEOs, may be incentivized to introduce such
changes. The model proposed in Part III below seeks to address this.
The other side of the market consists of the diverse potential
board and top management members. Women and members of
minority racial groups will be the main focus of this discussion, but
there will be some mention of members from different experiential
backgrounds. While a lot of literature has been devoted to how
diversity benefits companies,95 not nearly as much literature has
focused on why diverse candidates might want to serve as board
directors or even remain in the workforce in executive roles.
Often businesses and law firms lament that the pool of diverse
candidates is too shallow,96 but recent diversity databases show
that this is simply not the case.97 Instead, it is likely that women
and minority candidates are opting out of workplaces where racism,
sexism, bullying, and discrimination are prevalent.98 Similarly,
potential board members would likely want to opt out of boards
where they are merely hired as tokens to signal that the company
cares about diversity, rather than as members whose contributions
are valued. In one study, women directors said that they were not
treated as full members of the group and that “many male directors
seem unaware that they may create hostile board cultures, fail to
listen to female directors or accept them as equals, and require
them to continually reestablish their credentials.”99

93. Kamalnath, supra note 8, at 26.
94. Id. at 110–11.
95. See Kamalnath, supra note 8.
96. See Eli Wald, In-House Myths, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 407, 456 (2012).
97. See, e.g., Derek T. Dingle, Power in the Boardroom: Registry of Black
Corporate
Board
Members,
BLACK
ENTER.
(Sept.
18,
2018),
https://www.blackenterprise.com/registry-black-corporate-board-members-2018/
[https://perma.cc/X3D4-9QDS].
98. Cheryl L. Wade, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Racial Politics
Impedes Progress in the United States, 26 PACE INT’L L. REV. 23, 34 (2014).
99. Boris Groysberg & Deborah Bell, Dysfunction in the Boardroom, HARV. BUS.
REV.
(June
2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/06/dysfunction-in-the-boardroom
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There is also the issue of “glass cliffs,” in which women and
racial minorities are appointed only when a company is facing a
crisis.100 In any kind of crisis, but especially when the crisis involves
an issue of sexual harassment or unaddressed racism, a newly
appointed director who is a woman or a member of a racial minority
faces more scrutiny. For instance, when Ariana Huffington was
appointed to the board of Uber after the allegations of sexual
harassment created a reputational crisis for the company, some
news articles discussed her appointment with negative
undertones.101 Similarly, in response to the Black Lives Matter
movement, Reddit appointed a Black director to their board.102
Especially with appointments that are made in response to high
publicity events about company-specific or systemic injustices, it
becomes increasingly important for these diverse candidates to be
able to make informed assessments about the culture of the board
and the wider company.
Being part of a board that does not in fact facilitate discussions
of different perspectives means that diverse candidates will likely
be unable to truly influence the board’s decisions.103 Further, to
have an impact on issues like harassment and discrimination,
directors need to perform both monitoring and advisory roles. It is
then important to know whether the CEO and board culture
facilitates such involvement. Such information will allow board
candidates to assess whether they will be able to make a real
contribution to the company. This is particularly important for
diverse candidates who are hired in the context of social pressure
[https://perma.cc/ZGK7-HGRJ].
100. Douglas M. Branson, Pathways for Women to Senior Management Positions
and Board Seats: An A to Z List, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1555, 1568 (2012); Terry
Morehead Dworkin, Aarti Ramaswami & Cindy A. Schipani, A Half-Century PostTitle VII: Still Seeking Pathways for Women to Organizational Leadership, 23 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 29, 46 (2016).
101. See, e.g., Katerina Ang, Can Arianna Huffington Help Uber Recover from
Sexual
Harassment
Claims?,
MARKET
WATCH
(Mar.
24,
2017),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/can-arianna-huffington-help-uber-recoverfrom-sexual-harassment-claims-2017-03-24-9884450 [https://perma.cc/246D-RVZR].
102. Isabel Togoh, Michael Seibel Becomes Reddit’s First Black Board Member
After
Alexis
Ohanian’s
Resignation,
FORBES
(June
10,
2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/isabeltogoh/2020/06/10/michael-seibel-becomesreddits-first-black-board-member-after-alexis-ohanians-resignation/#5e551498430a
[https://perma.cc/9J7X-J6MG].
103. Dirk-Jan Van Veen, Ravi S. Kudesia & Hans R. Heinimann, An Agent-Based
Model of Collective Decision-Making: How Information Sharing Strategies Scale
With Information Overload, 7 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTATIONAL SOC. SYS.
751, 765 (2020) (finding that diversity alone will not improve decision-making in a
team if the team cannot “leverage the wisdom of disagreement”).
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resulting from social movements like #MeToo and Black Lives
Matter, since the expectation seems to be that these candidates will
help address problems of sexism and racism within the firm. If
candidates are in fact able to make such assessments, then
companies will also be incentivized to pay attention to these issues
in order to attract more diverse candidates. This presents the issue
of how a potential director may be assisted in making these
assessments accurately. This will be addressed in the model
proposed in Part III below.
What this Part II has described is a classic two-sided market
where companies want to appoint diverse candidates, either to
signal their commitment to social issues or to genuinely improve
governance, and diverse candidates want the ability to accurately
assess boards before joining them. As the next Part will show, thirdparties providing supplemental board services, like board
evaluations and executive and director search functions, are wellsuited to service this two-sided market. In doing so, shareholders
and
other
stakeholders
stand
to
gain
as
well.
III. Reliance on Third-Party Intermediaries
Third-party providers of supplemental board services like
executive and director searches and board evaluations are already
being used by companies.104 Omari Scott Simmons notes that
executive search firms act as intermediaries in the labor market for
executive talent since they facilitate transactions between
companies and potential executives.105 The executive search firms
are able to fill information gaps between these two parties; however,
as any third-party involvement naturally does, they do come with
costs.106 The fact that companies are using them indicates that the
benefits exceed any costs.107 For diverse candidates, the benefits are
even more valuable, and the costs presumably stay the same,
making acceptance of the costs much easier.
Executive search firms not only “research, identify, screen,
interview, verify candidate qualifications, and engage in final offer
negotiations,” but also provide “leadership consulting, succession
104. See Omari Scott Simmons, Forgotten Gatekeepers: Executive Search Firms
and Corporate Governance, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 807 (2019).
105. Id. at 815.
106. Id. at 816.
107. Id. at 817–19 (establishing that, amongst other things, the benefits to the
company include signaling good governance practices and shifting accountability).
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planning, and board assessment” services.108 Interestingly, the
larger executive search firms also offer “culture shaping.”109
Recently, one of the big executive search firms bought a leadership
consulting firm to consolidate its “culture shaping” offering.110 The
use of these executive search firms appears to be extensive: within
the director hiring process, executive search firms “on average
recommended 22.7% of independent directors to the board.”111
The recent emphasis on diversity in boards, coupled with
pressure from social movements, indicates that executive search
firms are likely to be used more frequently in the coming days.112
According to the board search guiding principles of the selfregulating Association of Executive Search and Leadership
Consultants (AESC), diversity is already one of the factors that
executive search firms engage with during the board consultation
process.113 On the company’s side, executive search firms work to
manage unconscious bias, while at the same time preparing
candidates by briefing them about the company’s culture and
strategy.114 Relatedly, they also focus on board refreshment
practices and succession planning.115
Executive search firms like the AESC also consult with boards
to provide advisory services which include assessing board culture,
creating an inclusive board culture, inducting new board members,
improving the relationship between the CEO and the board, and
clarifying the roles of the board, its committees, and its members.116
Crucially, it also includes board evaluation services.117 While board
evaluation is not a new idea, most company boards only conduct a

108. Id. at 820.
109. Id. at 825–26.
110. See Heidrick Buys ‘Culture Shaping’ Firm for $53 Million, STAFFING INDUS.
ANALYSTS (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www2.staffingindustry.com/site/Editorial/DailyNews/US-Heidrick-Buys-Culture-Shaping-Firm-for-53-Million-24168
[https://perma.cc/486L-9M3E].
111. Ali C. Akyol & Lauren Cohen, Who Chooses Board Members?, in ADVANCES
IN FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 43, 14 (Emerald Publ’g Ltd. 2013).
112. See Ang, supra note 101; Togoh, supra note 102; Branson, supra note 100;
Dworkin, supra note 100; ASS’N OF EXEC. SEARCH AND LEADERSHIP CONSULTANTS,
AESC BOARD SEARCH & ADVISORY SERVICES GUIDING PRINCIPLES 2–3 (AESC ed.,
2016).
113. ASS’N OF EXEC. SEARCH AND LEADERSHIP CONSULTANTS, supra note 112.
114. Id. at 4.
115. Id. at 3.
116. Id. at 5.
117. Id.
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self-assessment.118 Outsourcing it to a third-party firm can bring
objectivity into the process. Since these same third-party firms also
act as intermediaries for director appointments, the evaluations can
be used as an important metric for candidates to assess the
company. Thus, executive search firms, through the range of
supplemental board services they provide, are already acting as
intermediaries between boards and candidates for board
directorships.
To ensure that these intermediaries are efficiently serving
both sides of the market, it is necessary for them to focus their
evaluations of company culture on issues that diverse board
members might find particularly challenging. As discussed earlier
in this article, important questions like whether dissentient views
are frowned upon, or whether board members have timely access to
information,119 should be included in the evaluation metrics. These
issues speak to a board’s culture and diverse directors will
particularly value these metrics when making decisions. Even
information about the companies’ board refreshment policies and
succession planning can be useful to potential candidates in
assessing the culture of the board. The more refreshment there is,
the more open the board is to hear from newer members.120 These
factors might also help candidates who fulfill other facets of
diversity (e.g., those from a different experiential background) to
decide whether to take on the board position.
Further, under the current monitoring board model—since
diverse board members usually bear the burden of being appointed
after a human crisis (e.g., harassment, bullying, etc.) within the
company or a social movement drawing attention to systemic
problems—diverse directors cannot afford to be as under-committed
to the company as many other independent directors currently are.
Eventually, greater involvement of diverse directors, coupled with
pressure from intermediaries providing board advisory services,
has the potential to change the expectations for all independent
directors.
Even though executive search firms provide numerous
advantages, it is not advisable for regulators to require companies
to engage them for director nomination, board evaluation, and other
118. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL SECTION 303A CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE STANDARDS 1–14 (NYSE ed., 2004) (requiring companies to conduct
self-evaluations at least annually).
119. Kamalnath, supra note 8, at 113, 118.
120. Id. at 118.
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board advisory services. It is likely that mandating board
evaluation exercises would result in tick-the-box compliance rather
than genuine investment in the process.121 A better approach would
be the creation of a market driven process in which the demand for
board diversity results in intermediary firms refining their board
evaluation processes based on the needs of diverse candidates. That
said, the informational needs of diverse candidates is an underresearched issue that needs to be highlighted. Once the importance
of board evaluation reports and their positive link to board diversity
is understood, institutional investors, many of whom are already
active on the diversity agenda, will begin to engage with companies
requiring disclosure of board evaluation reports on these lines.
Executive search firms would be able to exclude confidential
information and provide a version of the report that is easily
digestible for outsiders. Proactive companies could even start to
make these reports available on their company website so that they
are available not only to potential board members and investors,
but also to the wider society.
Conclusion
This Article has attempted to address board diversity and
board effectiveness in conjunction, because the former has potential
to address the latter. However, it is not as simple as adding some
diverse directors to the board and expecting governance problems
to be resolved. There are serious problems with the current
monitoring model of the board and, while it may be tempting to
assume that diversity is an easy fix, it is time to realize that
diversity will only be useful when complemented by other measures.
The model proposed in this Article offers a solution to help both
companies and diverse directors.
This Article has also reviewed a number of new board models,
some as drastic as outsourcing the board entirely.122 It has reviewed
and drawn from less drastic models, such as the one proposed by
Stevelman and Haan123 and the one already in use at Netflix.124 The
Board 3.0 Model offers a good blueprint for adoption by companies
121. See Luca Enriques & Dirk Zetzsche, Quack Corporate Governance, Round III:
Bank Board Regulation Under the New European Capital Requirement Directive, 16
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 211, 212 (2015).
122. Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 1, at 1056.
123. See Stevelman & Haan, supra note 60.
124. See Larcker & Tayan, supra note 34.
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and could work in conjunction with the intermediary model
suggested in this article. The model proposed here is also significant
because it emphasizes the needs of diverse board members, which
has generally been an under-researched area in corporate
governance. In future research, this author hopes to empirically
support the model proposed in this Article by interviewing diverse
directors about the factors they considered before joining company
boards, as well as what factors they might consider in the future.

